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Abstract 
 
Admitting the theory of a company being a set of multiple interests, the first part of this 
article intends to give an overview of the Shareholder and Stockholders models in the 
Corporate Social Responsibility debate. The prevailing view in western Company Law 
(the cases of the UK and US are considered) is that of the Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization model. For the author of the article, events such as the financial crisis 
showed that the financial conditions of companies giving its‘ extended effects should 
give way to calls for public accountability in company management. However there 
seems to be a deadlock given that the prevailing model favours shareholders. 
In this scenario the Reporting of Non-Financial Information is studied as a way to 
create socially responsible businesses. In addressing the reporting of non-financial 
information, the article provides a state of affairs regarding reporting and considers 
specific examples of disclosure of corporate information. The CSR battle has been 
transferred to the reporting of non-financial information but in this field there are many 
difficulties unresolved and challenges ahead.  
Key words: Corporate Social Responsibility, Non-Financial Reporting, Stockholders, 
Reporting. 
 
Resumen 
Partiendo del punto de vista de la Sociedad Mercantil como un conjunto de intereses, 
la primera parte del artículo ofrece un resumen de los modelos de los Accionistas y 
Stockholders en materia de Responsabilidad Social Empresarial. El punto de vista 
mayoritario en el Derecho Societario occidental (los casos del Reino Unido y Estados 
Unidos son mencionados) es el de la Maximización de las Utilidades para los 
Accionistas.  No obstante, eventos como la crisis financiera de 2007 ponen en 
                                                     
 Este artículo fue presentado a la revista el día 7 de Septiembre de 2011 y fue 
aceptado para su publicación por el Comité Editorial el día 24 de noviembre  de 2011, 
previa revisión del concepto emitido por el árbitro evaluador. 
1 This paper was written during part of my stay in London thanks to the immense 
support received from my university, Universidad Externado de Colombia. To the 
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commented and criticised this article prior to its publication. The possible mistakes on 
the text however are entirely my fault. 
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evidencia que el manejo de las empresas tiene efectos extendidos sobre otros grupos 
de interés. Esta situación en opinión del autor hace que exista una legitimación en 
pedir un sentido de responsabilidad en favor de los grupos de interés afectados lo cual 
no resulta sencillo si se tiene en cuenta que el modelo prevaleciente es el de los 
accionistas.  
En este escenario, el reporte de Información No Financiera se analiza como una forma 
de crear empresas socialmente responsables. Al revisar el tema el artículo cubre el 
estado del arte en material de reporte de información no financiera de sociedades e 
incluye ejemplos específicos sobre regímenes de revelación de información societaria. 
La batalla de la RSE ha sido trasladada al campo del reporte de información no 
financiera de sociedades pero en este campo hay muchas dificultades sin resolver y 
desafíos al acecho. 
Palabras Claves: Responsabilidad Social Empresarial, Reporte, Información No 
Financiera, Stockholders.   
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Introduction 
The way in which a company is managed has been a particular concern of Corporate 
Law and Corporate Governance academic literature for some time in the past. At a 
present age, where governments and institutions must come up with solutions to the 
stagnating economic development in the world these issues are again relevant. The 
social interest involved in the management of companies is one of these issues. 
This document will merely reflect upon a specific point already known by practitioners 
and academics: the social responsibilities of companies. Arguably the debate is not 
new and has been settled in favour of sustaining that Corporate Law should and does 
in fact give prevalence to the interest of the shareholders and that other interest 
involved in a Company are better dealt with by other areas of law or business 
management. However, there seems to be an impression (it might be a personal one) 
that the goal of responsible business should be pursued, encouraged and perhaps 
even required. A particular way for this to happen might well be the reporting of 
information by companies regarding their social performance.   
Thus, I intend to cover the premises of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization and the 
Stakeholder Theory. The US and the UK will be used as terms of reference in their 
regulatory attempts to include stakeholders‘ interests as part of Corporate Law. 
Specifically, the US ―constituency statutes‖ and the UK‘s Enlightened Shareholder 
Value would be considered. In doing this reference it will be stated that in fact 
Shareholders are the preferred constituency yet as a matter of fact the impact of 
companies on larger constituents cannot be ignored and its consideration as part of 
their management cannot be entirely suppressed. The 2007-2008 financial crisis gave 
yet another example in modern history of the unintended effect of companies on 
extended constituencies. This justifies a call for public accountability of companies. 
However, from a Shareholder Primacy perspective, the regulatory responses for this 
are limited. Self-regulation is an alternative and you might say that so it is government 
regulation. Both already have a ―handicap‖: shareholder primacy should not be put into 
question.  
From this perspective is that I intend to analyse Corporate Reporting as regulatory tool 
used by governments to show some political commitment without imposing a particular 
substantive duty to companies. Yet many challenges surround the reporting of non-
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financial information. Whether reporting should be mandatory, the lack of 
standardisation of the reported information and the utility of reports should be 
considered. Furthermore, there are regulatory challenges as to the political context for 
regulating certain interest groups: I will use as example the regulation on the reporting 
of bank‘s executive remuneration in the UK.  
All of these premises and challenges lead to the question of whether or not Mandatory 
Reporting of non-financial information is the solution for engaging companies in social 
responsible practices.  
1. A preliminary issue: What does Corporate Social Responsibility 
mean?  
What is understood as CSR? Is it a legal term? Is it a business concept? It is precisely 
this lack of certainty one of the characteristics of this topic. Yet in law the lack of a clear 
definition might be intentional and due to the existence of innovative legal concepts 
likely to be in permanent evolution, thus by not defining them there is room left for their 
development.3 However, a starting point definition adopted and adapted from existing 
academic literature4 (without intending it to be flawless) would be useful and thus it 
would be possible to say that CSR recognises the existence that in a company there 
are interests other than those of shareholders that can be affected by the way in which 
a company is managed. Accordingly, CSR constitutes a set of corporate practices that 
take into account all the interests involved in the operation of a company. 
With this general definition at hand it is possible to move on to establish in whose 
interest companies should be managed. 
2. In whose interest should companies be managed?  
The core of the definition previously set out rests in the existence of multiple interests 
around a company all of which should be taken into consideration by those managing 
it. Thus, the title of this part of the paper shows a question commonly addressed by 
Corporate Governance commentators. This question would naturally lead us to briefly 
                                                     
3 M. Kerr et al. Corporate Social Responsibility. A legal analysis. (Ontario, 2009), P. 5.  
4 Particularly interesting are the definitions contained in M. Kerr et all, n.1 above, pp. 6-
8.  
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refer to a classic debate as to whether or not companies should have any social 
responsibility at all. 
a. The traditional and (so far?) prevailing perspective: The Shareholder 
Primacy or Shareholder Wealth Maximization Theory  
The date or origins of this tendency are not that important for this paper,5 the relevant 
fact is the recognition that in Company Law the shareholders are the preferred and 
prevailing constituency.  
There are different authors and references to understand an approach to this theory6, 
one of the most commonly cited due to its importance but also mordacity is Milton 
Friedman who argues that managers of companies should only have one social 
responsibility: to pursue profits for the shareholders.7 Friedman sees social 
responsibilities as an individual moral duty that falls outside legal entities such as 
companies (he uses the economic term of firms). Thus it is up to individuals to pursue 
any kind of social responsible goals. In a private sphere, any individual may pursue 
whatever interests he desires and in doing so he would be acting as principal of his 
own interests. In the case of companies, corporate executives are the executors of the 
companies will however when they are acting as managers they do so as agents of the 
owners, thus if they pursue an interest in their capacity as executives of the company 
they would be acting as agents of someone else‘s interests. As such, there can be 
entities structured to pursue social goals but the difficulty comes about when business 
executives intend to implement social behaviour on the company without the authority 
of the owners. On the one hand, this situation represents for Friedman a clear 
undermining ―of the basis of a free society‖8 being nothing more than ―pure and mere 
                                                     
5 Professor A. Keay in one of his several articles briefly discusses them on the topic: A. 
Keay, Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, Enlightened 
Shareholder Value and all that: Much Ado about little? (2010). 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1530990> Accessed on 18 July 2011.  
6 S. Bainbridge. ‗In Defense of the Shareholder Maximisation Norm: A Reply to 
Professor Green‘. (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1423. H. Hansmann 
and R. Kraakman. The End Of History For Corporate Law (January 2000). 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=204528> Accesed on 9 July 2011. Friedman. ‗A Friedman 
doctrine. The Social Responsibility of Companies is to increase profits‘. (New York 
Times, September 13, 1970). 
7 M. Friedman. n. 4 above. P.4 
8 M. Friedman. n. 4 above. P.1. 
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unadulterated socialism‖.9 On the other hand it represents the functioning of business 
executives as public representatives by deciding how someone else‘s money should 
be used towards socially desirable purposes. This implies the existence of CSR as an 
anti-democratic scheme.10 In addition, a director seeking social goals sacrificing profits 
is most likely to be fired by the existing or future shareholders (since the share price is 
likely to be reduced and the business exposed to a takeover bid) being replaced for 
directors with a different attitude towards those social responsibilities.11 Furthermore, 
as to the use of socially responsible practices as a mechanism to obtain good 
reputation, Friedman recognises that the market may reward a business that engages 
in these trends and thus it would be in the best interest of the firm to do so however 
this would be not only hypocritical but also fraudulent.  
From Friedman‘s view, the Shareholder Theory has evolved accepting that 
shareholders are not owners of the company but merely owners of a share, which 
gives them an entitlement to some rights.12 This concept creates a difference in the 
logical structure of the argument as he proposed it. Bainbridge for instance accepts the 
existence of flaws in Friedman‘s reasoning since an updated theory of the firm has a 
different rationale and sees the firm, as a nexus of contracts and by definition is not 
possible to own the nexus itself. However, according to Bainbridge this logic although 
appropriate does not have a substantial effect on Shareholder Primacy. From the claim 
that managers are not stealing from the shareholders since it is not their money (it is 
the company‘s) one cannot jump to the conclusion that Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization should be abandoned.13 Theoretically Bainbridge differentiates between 
the objective of a company and the ultimate control over its management,14 claiming 
that Shareholder Primacy argues for the increase of profits for shareholders and the 
control given to directors.15 Accordingly there might be situations where in order to 
achieve a higher value for the shareholders; a company‘s management should have 
                                                     
9 M. Friedman. n. 4 above. P. 1.  
10 M. Friedman. n. 4 above. P. 3. 
11 M. Friedman. n. 4 above. P. 3. 
12 R. Grantham, ‗The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders‘, (1998) 
57 Cambridge Law Journal 554. 
13 S. Bainbridge. n.4 above. P. 1428.   
14 That is the difference between ownership and control presented by Bearle and 
Means.  
15 In theory it is given to the shareholders who in turn choose the directors, in practice 
however it is a power of the directors. 
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regard of the interest of other constituencies.16 Yet, he openly defends shareholder 
maximization as the ideal model at least in the US and shows some scepticism as to a 
normative move towards a primacy of other stakeholders. In the same line of 
reasoning, Professors H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman argued over a decade ago 
defending the prevalence of the interest of shareholders in the management of 
companies. They stated that such should be the focus of corporate law and claimed 
that with time this would be a worldwide tendency without disregarding that companies 
should consider social goals, engage in non-commercial activities and act considering 
the benefit of other constituencies, yet it is not efficient for Company Law to achieve 
that result. The best use of the resources involved in the management of a company 
are better left to managers for the interest of their shareholders. This dogmatic view of 
Company Law is pure in a Kelsen sense, leaving it to other areas of law to take care of 
those other constituencies. The social responsibility of a company according to them is 
to perform its activities in accordance with the law in all its regulatory regimes.17  
b. The recognition of other interest: The Stakeholder Theory  
The argument cannot be completed without mentioning those who claim rightly that 
companies tend naturally to have an effect over other constituencies with whom they 
interact and do not restrict exclusively to the interest of those who provide the 
company‘s capital.18 In that sense interest groups such as the consumers of the goods 
and services provided by the company, its‘ employees, its‘ creditors, the community 
where it operates and even the environment are somewhat affected by a company and 
that is why the objective of a company19 should focus not only on making profits for the 
capital providers but also for all existing stakeholders and furthermore they should be 
managed and be accountable to those extended constituencies.20  
                                                     
16 This view has been found in case law. For instance see: People’s Department Stores 
v. Wise [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461. Where it was especifically said that: ―…in determining 
whether they are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be 
legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to 
consider, inter alia, the interests of the shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, 
consumers, governments and the environment.‖ 
17 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman. n. 4 above. P. 9.  
18 Perhaps the main defender of this tendency is R. Freeman. Strategic Management: a 
stakeholder perspective, (New Jersey, 1984). 
19 In the sense used by Bainbridge. n. 4 above.   
20 A. Keay. n. 3 above. P. 6. 
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While accepting that the Shareholder Wealth Maximization is the prevailing 
perspective, it seems that it is no longer an entirely satisfactory explanation and 
justification in a global economy. There are sets of events in which this paper does not 
intend to dwell showing demands for a sense of accountability of private entities in 
reason of the impact they have on extended interest groups.21 However, what 
constituencies should be given preference? Do all constituencies affect all companies 
in the same manner? The reform of Company Law embodied in the Companies Act 
2006 saw some of these questions at the core of the restatement of Directors‘ Duties 
where while acknowledging the traditional acceptance of the shareholders‘ as the 
preferred interest group within Company Law, the Act tried to fit the interests of a 
broader stakeholder approach. The English government proposed the so-called 
―Enlightened Shareholder Value‖ as the objective managers should have in discharging 
their duties. This Enlightened Shareholder Value gave rise to the idea that at last there 
was a substantial shift in the focus of attention of Director‘s Duties and thus the 
Stakeholder Theory would have gained way into legislation. Yet all the excitement 
came to an end when a proper assessment of the provision was undertaken. Currently, 
the ―enlightenment‖ is contained in S. 172 of the Act where it is stated that managers 
should exercise their duties as directors in the best interests of the company aligning 
the interests of the company with that of it‘s current shareholders. Nonetheless in such 
discharge directors could take into consideration the interest of a list of other extended 
constituencies different from shareholders included in Companies Act S.172 (1) (a)-
(f).22 
                                                     
21 C. Williams. ‗Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization‘. 
35. U.C. Davis. L. Review. 706. 2001-2002. P. 4. 
22 For the aid of readers I cite an unusually long footnote:  
UK Companies Act 2006. S. 172. Duty to promote the success of the company 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to— 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company's employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the 
environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and 
(f)the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
REVIST@ e – Mercatoria  Volumen 10, Número 2 (julio – diciembre 
2011) 
(Rev. e-mercatoria) 
 
132 Universidad Externado de Colombia. Departamento de Derecho Comercial                     
 
Is this provision particularly innovative? Not really. At a comparative level, it is possible 
to find that for instance the US had previously attempted a similar approach although 
not by way of legislation. The Constituencies Statutes adopted by the majority of states 
in the US allowed managers to consider the interests of groups other than the 
shareholders of the company. Some commentators on these statutes mention that the 
extent and practical effect of their wording sometimes allowed not only to consider 
extended constituencies but even to treat them all (including the shareholders) as 
entirely equal.23 Yet, even if some of these statutes took such a radical approach to the 
debate, their practical effect was not substantial. The area in which they were mainly 
considered was in takeover situations where managers could take into account the 
interest of those constituencies in order to accept or reject a takeover bid. Their use 
was sometimes seen as a hindrance, and given the regulatory competitive environment 
in the US24 and that states as Delaware did not include such statutes in their 
legislation, they would end up becoming ineffective.25 Notwithstanding, it can be argued 
as Keay does26 that there is an underlying theoretical value for the legislation regarding 
these statutes: the pervasive thought that companies should not only be managed with 
regard to the interests of the shareholders of the company. Thus its importance is not 
entirely lost.  
 
At an English level, the 1985 Companies Act already contained a provision27 that could 
be seen to allow for an inclusion of the Stakeholder Theory, and even case law was 
developed before 2006 admitting that directors while discharging their duties could 
have regard of the interest of employees.28 Some commentators even argue that the 
                                                                                                                                                           
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include 
purposes other than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the 
reference to promoting the success of the company for the benefit of its members were 
to achieving those purposes. 
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law 
requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of 
creditors of the company. 
23 The following comments are based on the analysis brought forward by A. Keay. n. 3 
above. Pp. 8-19. 
24 F. Reyes Villamizar. Derecho Societario de los Estados Unidos. Introducción 
Comparada. (Bogotá, 2006). P. 51.   
25 A. Keay. n. 3 above. Pp. 8-19.  
26 A. Keay. n. 3 above. P. 12. 
27 Companies Act 1985 S. 309. Directors to have regard to interests of employees. 
28 Re Welfab Engineers Ltd [1990] BCC 600.  
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previous UK provisions had more practical consequences,29 thus the existing regime 
seems not only to lack innovation, but also useless for the constituencies themselves. 
It is perhaps the first case where mandatory legislation of director‘s duties tries to 
balance those conflicting interests. The approach doesn‘t accept the Stakeholder 
Theory in full and specifically supports the shareholders as the prevailing interest group 
in company management. The idea as the former UK Minister of State for the Industry 
would admit is to modernise English Company Law and align the interest of all those 
who have a stake in the company: ―The law is now based on a new approach. 
Pursuing the interests of shareholders and embracing wider responsibilities are 
complementary purposes, not contradictory ones.‖30  
 
The acceptance of the extended constituencies under S.172 of the UK Companies Act 
2006 can be critically seen as timid and made with the intent to give the impression of 
change but with no substantial underlying effect for the reason that the constituencies 
do not have a direct tool to enforce the rights conferred to them by the section. English 
Company Law still operates under the rules in Percival v Wright, Foss v Harbottle and 
Hickman which restrict the ability of the constituencies contained in S.172 (1) (a)-(f) to 
initiate a claim in their own right. S.172 is included as part of Directors Duties, and so 
according to Percival v Wright31 directors owe their duties to the company and not to 
other individuals such as shareholders or stakeholders.32 Thus, if for instance directors 
fail to execute their duties adequately by not considering the interests of employees in 
a company decision, the employees could not start an action since S.172 contains a 
duty of the directors owed to the company and thus the proper claimant would be the 
                                                     
29 The fact that the interest of constituencies such as consumers, employees and the 
environment are included although remarkable for a Company Law statute, should be 
critically assessed by the fact that those constituencies cannot enforce on their own 
benefit such provisions given that directors duties are owed to the company and the 
assessment of those further interests is made as part of such exercise. J. Lowry. ‗The 
Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: Bridging the Accountability Gap through Efficient 
Disclosure‘. (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal (3). Also see: A. Keay. n.3 above. P. 
56. 
30 DTI. Ministerial Statements. ‗Duties of Company Directors‘. Companies Act 2006. 
June 2007. <http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file40139.pdf> Accessed on 23 February 2011.  
31 [1902] 2 Ch 421. 
32 In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) it was especifically 
said that Management of the company should focus on the profits for the stockholders.  
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company.33 It could happen that by means of a derivative claim the cause of action that 
originally was created in favour of the company would fall upon the shareholders. 
However, for this to work under the stakeholder perspective there would either need to 
be a hypothetical case where a shareholder decides to start an action for the benefit of 
the constituencies (which even though is not impossible it reflects some doubts as to 
the practical effects of the section) or one of the stakeholders would also need to be a 
shareholder of the company,34 yet the exercise of the action might be restricted either 
by the terms of issue of the shares (no action clauses) or generally by the Hickman 
Principle according to which a shareholder can only claim a right given in his condition 
as shareholder and not in his condition as consumer or employee.35 Thus, as the 
constituencies included in the provision are not able to enforce it on their own right, the 
provision is for directors to use it as a defence in discharging their duties. The provision 
can be used as a shield not as a spear.36 That is, they can defend their business 
judgement by saying that they took a specific business decision taking into account the 
interests of those extended constituencies. 
These practical flaws however were not entirely ignored by the government when 
adopting the existing wording. The Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG) 
identified a tendency to accept that directors should consider the interest of other 
groups without necessarily giving primacy to members of the company. However it 
didn‘t find a practical response as to how this could be enforced. Thus it recommended 
the government to reject such an absolutely pluralist approach on the basis of it‘s being 
unworkable or inconvenient.37 Furthermore, the government rejected the idea of 
extending directors duties to other constituencies by means of mandatory rules, yet the 
political lobby during the enactment of the Companies Act managed to repeal the 
inclusion of an Operating Financial Review (OFR) required from all listed companies 
                                                     
33 Companies Act 2006. S. 260. According to the rationale of one of the prongs of the 
rule established in Foss v Harbottle [1958] CLJ 93. 
34 This could happen if for instance there is an employee share scheme, or the 
stakeholders go into the securities market. 
35 Hickman v Kent. [1915] 1 Ch. 881. However this principle does include exceptions 
but mainly addressed at directors rights under the constitution.  
36 L. Sealy and S. Worthington. Sealy’s Cases and Materials in Company Law. (Oxford. 
2010), P. 322.   
37 CLRSG report. Completing the Structure. November 2000. § 3.5. 
<http://www.berr.gov.uk/bbf/co-act-2006/> Accessed on March 7 2011. This argument 
of inconvenience would also be used by other countries while considering adopting the 
UK approach and consequently rejected altogether.  See A. Keay. n. 3. P. 41.   
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where social and environmental information would have to be included and thus in the 
final version only S.417 of the Companies Act survived requiring directors to provide 
shareholders with a much simpler Financial Review (not as part of listing requirements) 
that would help them assess the performance of director‘s duties under S. 172. This 
report is meant to be a narrative and forward-looking statement included in the 
company‘s annual report. Therefore, without sacrificing the ―new scope‖ of duties, the 
rationale would be to eliminate the risk of an increase in litigation for company 
directors, and thus the enforcement of S.172 would be achieved by way of reporting 
and consequentially by encouraging public accountability of companies rather than by 
fear of litigation.38  
From this perspective, where the recognition of other interest involved in the 
management of a company and the failure to find a scheme under Company Law to 
reconcile them and protect them in an efficient manner, a regulatory alternative has 
been the reporting of non-financial information of companies as we shall later continue 
to explore.  
c. Did S.172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 solve the Shareholder vs 
Stakeholder debate? 
An assessment on the effectiveness of S.172 allowed us to see that its‘ value should 
be considered carefully and even though it is contained in a statute, and made its way 
into legislation its practical effect is reduced to the voluntary practice of companies. At 
paragraph 2.21 the CLRSG document on Modernizing Company Law: Developing the 
Framework, it is recognized that Chapter 10 of the Companies Act 2006 aims at a 
balance between the pluralist approach and shareholder primacy. This balance 
however is not easy to find, and thus regulation did not attempt to try one by way of 
mandatory regulation. It was acknowledged that the reputational risk of not adopting 
sustainable business practices could serve as the missing link between the interest of 
the shareholders and other interest groups. This observation summarizes the state of 
affairs in the UK. There is an awareness of the voices that claim companies must 
consider larger interests, but the government lacks a clear regulatory response on the 
way to achieve this within a free market framework thus it is still a primary object to 
manage companies in the interest of shareholders. The matter is more conveniently 
                                                     
38 DTI. Ministerial Statements. n. 28 above. P. 6. 
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seen as a management issue made on a voluntary basis. Therefore managers could 
engage in corporate practices that include other constituencies without being liable to 
the board or the shareholders for doing so. On the other hand there is no direct form of 
enforcing S. 172 by the remaining stakeholders.  
Notwithstanding the recognition of the prevalence of shareholders as an interest group 
the theoretical debate continues39. Haansman and Kraakman argued that there is a 
social responsibility of companies: functioning according to the law. Thus in this view 
CSR would need to be part of the existing legal framework to be part of a company‘s 
social responsibilities, yet achieving CSR regulation is a difficult process. However, 
from a business management perspective, engagement in CSR is a sound practice40. 
Companies engage in sustainable practices that involve extended constituencies. This 
is a reality, even though it is not mandatory. This explains the existence of indexes 
showing engagement in accepted socially responsible practices,41 or the existence of 
an ethical investment market with Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) criteria. 
Companies get involved in CSR practices for many different reasons i.e. improvement 
of internal processes, reputational risks, benchmarking, financial market pressure, 
                                                     
39 A.K. Sundaram and A.C. Inkpen. ‗Stakeholder Theory and ―The Corporate Objective 
revisited‖: A reply.‘ Vol. 15, No. 3 Organization Science. May-June 2004. Pp. 370-371. 
40 The debate can also be brought in terms of weather or not CSR has a financial 
return. In this regard, it is helpful the analysis and the figures studied in J. Allouche 
(ed). Corporate Social Responsibility: Performance and stakeholders. Part One: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Economic/Financial Performance. On a more up to 
date reference as to whether or not the market is in need of non-financial information, 
reference should be made to two working papers from the Business Faculty of Harvard 
University showing that focus on long term growth and sustainability is rewarded with 
higher share prices and that there is indeed a growing interest on non-financial 
information on the market. In this last regard the papers establish a difference between 
different types of consumers of this information (i.e. equity providers, buy-out users or 
creditors), different kinds of information (social issues, environmental issues, 
management and governance issues) and the possible reasons that make some of 
them more required by consumers than others (i.e. easy to measure or include in 
models, greater impact on governance of a company, effect on share price, etc.). 
Eccles, Krzus and Serafeim. ‗Markets interest in Nonfinancial Information‘. Harvard 
Business School. Working Paper 12-018. September 22, 2011. 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6841.html Accessed on October 2011. Eccles, Ioannou and 
Serafeim. ‗The Impact of a Corporate Culture of Sustainability on Corporate Behavior 
(sic) and Performance‘. Harvard Business School. Working Paper 12-035. November 
04, 2011. http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6865.html?wknews=11092011  Accessed on 
November 2011. 
41 <http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/index.jsp>. Accessed on 
July 18th 2011.  
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moral acceptance, etc.42 Yet these practices and evidences are still left to private 
initiatives and self-regulation since government regulation would hamper evolution. 
Notwithstanding, evolution is still possible once a regulatory framework exists but given 
that Shareholder Wealth Maximization is the prevailing view, substantive regulation 
imposing social responsibilities does not appear to be justified. This is the context in 
which regulation as to CSR reporting emerged. Still there have been some changes 
and evolutions that deserve to be reviewed. 
3. The reporting of non-financial information  
Companies produce more than just financial statements that can help in the 
assessment of their financial and social performance. Thus, in the spectrum of 
corporate reporting there is both financial and non-financial information and some 
commentators go even further arguing the existence of a separate kind: CSR 
information. Given the focus of this paper the last two should be considered and the 
latter in particular. According to Chiu, non-financial information provides elements for 
shareholders to review the proper functioning of the board of directors and complement 
the assessment of the company‘s financial performance.43 On the other hand, CSR 
information possesses different ethical needs and motivations thus allowing for a 
separate legal and regulatory treatment.44 Beyond the doctrinal favouring of the 
Shareholder Primacy Theory, I have argued here for the acceptance of calls for public 
accountability of companies and therefore the public reporting of information regarding 
social responsibilities is thought to have become necessary. The purpose of this 
information would be to bring about accountability for extended constituencies and not 
                                                     
42 N. Finch. ‗The Motivations for adopting Sustainability Disclosure‘. Macquaire 
Graduate School of Management. Working Paper 2005-17. 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=798724> Accessed on 11 July 2011. Futerra Sustainability 
Communications, et al. Trends in non-financial Reporting. Reporting Change. Readers 
and Reporters Survey 2010. 
<http://www.futerra.co.uk/downloads/Reporting_Change.pdf> Accessed on 16 August 
2011.  
43 I. H-Y. Chiu. ‗The paradigms of mandatory non-financial disclosure: a conceptual 
analysis: Part 1.‘ 2006. Company Lawyer. 259. P. 7-12. 
44 Chiu does not agree with this and that is one of the reasons why it is possible to 
differentiate between non-financial disclosure and corporate social disclosure. See: I. 
H-Y. Chiu. N. 40 above. P. 1-3; I. H-Y. Chiu. ‗The paradigms of mandatory non-
financial disclosure: a conceptual analysis: Part 2.‘ 2006. Company Lawyer. 291. P. 7. 
The differentiation of different types of non-financial information is also used as a 
matter of fact by Eccles, Krzus and Serafeim. n. 38 above.  
REVIST@ e – Mercatoria  Volumen 10, Número 2 (julio – diciembre 
2011) 
(Rev. e-mercatoria) 
 
138 Universidad Externado de Colombia. Departamento de Derecho Comercial                     
 
to create mechanisms for shareholder discipline (by evaluating the short-term value 
and financial performance of the company).45 Nonetheless there are many challenges 
for the reporting of this kind of information.  
a. Corporate Reporting as a regulatory tool and its Challenges 
In the absence of a dogmatic agreement as to whether or not companies should have 
social responsibilities regulators do not seem to find a legitimate foundation to require 
companies to display socially responsible behaviour. Yet there are interest groups such 
as unions, NGOs and recently newspapers and consumers that, by being critical of the 
social implications of companies, are pressing for public accountability of them. In this 
setting the reporting of information is an ideal regulatory tool because it allows 
governments to show engagement with these social needs without in fact imposing a 
substantive mandate on private enterprises.46 Furthermore, the reporting of company 
information responds to the need to promote transparency and public accountability by 
making information publicly available for interested parties to access and assess it. 
Regardless of the critics of this hypothesis, the reasoning appears to be similar to that 
of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) where, by making the largest 
amount of information publicly available, the market will incorporate it within the share 
price of a company.47 However, Corporate Reporting in general faces many challenges 
and criticisms. Some commentators see the fact that reporting is the ideal regulatory 
tool as a downside because governments fail to engage with the underlying issues 
being reported in order not to risk their political capital.48 Reporting is deceptive as a 
regulatory tool because it attempts to show a political will but without assuming any 
clear position.49 Governments would be willing to require reporting but not to impose 
substantive regulation, letting the users of the information deal with it unsystematically. 
This political behaviour avoids the displacement of responsibility so that regulators 
cannot be blamed for lack of action since there is in fact some regulation, although not 
                                                     
45 I. H-Y. Chiu. n. 40 above. P. 2.  
46 M. Pallenberg at all. Trends in non-financial reporting. Global Public Policy Institute. 
Berlin. 2006. P. 27. <http://www.gppi.net/publications/research_paper_series/> 
Accessed on 16 August 2011.   
47 J. Coffee Jr. ‗Market Failure and the Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System‘. 70 
Va. L. Rev. 717 1984.  
48 O.S. Simmons. ‗Taking the Blue Pill: The imponderable impact of executive 
remuneration reform‘. 62 S.M.U.L. Rev. 299 2009. P. 321.  
49 P. Cioppa. ‗Executive compensation. The Fallacy of Disclosure‘. Vol. 6. Issue 3. 
Global Jurist Topics. 2003. 
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enough as to be seen as the cause of the problem. By avoiding this risk, not only would 
political capital be spared but also regulators would be seen as credible and effective 
agents. 
Our focus on corporate reporting comes at a time when the tide for regulatory action is 
rising; new regulation may be around the corner or is already being implemented. 
Several fronts of battle are taking place:  
- At an International level, last year the International Integrated Reported Council 
(IIRC) was launched as an initiative to achieve in the foreseeable future an 
integrated model of reporting that modernizes reporting practices and is suitable for 
sustainable practices.50  
- At a European level, at the end of last year a consultation was launched on non-
financial reporting, and following the receipt of the responses, the European 
Commission appointed an Expert Group in charge of assessing the regulatory 
alternatives.51 Furthermore, the Single Market Act (SMA) has the aim of increasing 
transparency and thus confidence in the European market and in a similar direction 
the Capital Requirements Directive (CDR3) on disclosure of remuneration. This last 
Directive is being implemented in the UK through SYRC.  
- In the UK, the consultation process made by the BIS and Section 417 of the 
Companies Act 2006 sets a general framework for Corporate Reporting. Moreover, 
the Financial Services Authority and the Financial Reporting Council have set out 
complementary disclosure requirements for companies contained in the FSA 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules, the FSA Listing Rules, the FSA Handbook, 
and the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
The aftermath of the 2007 crisis seems to have identified some fundamental Corporate 
Governance flaws that although were not the cause of the crisis, may have contributed 
to the results that were seen and suffered throughout the world. In all these cases the 
approach chosen by regulators seems to be the disclosure of information. By providing 
                                                     
50 <www.theiirc.org> Accessed on 15 August 2011.  
51 European Comission. Directorate General Internal Market and Services. Capital and 
Companies. Accounting and financial reporting. Expert Group on Disclosure of Non-
Financial information by EU Companies First Meeting. Brussels, 11 July 2011. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/non-
financial_reporting_en.htm> Accessed on 19 August 2011.  
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the information to the market all the market participants are better informed (at least in 
theory) with a transparent veil surrounding market transactions ergo creating a feeling 
of trust. These battlefronts however do not make the difference between non-financial 
information and CSR reporting mentioned above. This lack of differentiation could be a 
dangerous path for the future of CSR52 since its future may be linked to that of non-
financial information for better or worse, however, it must not be forgotten that it is 
already hard enough to justify the need for disclosure of certain types of non-financial 
information. Therefore, in this paper, even though accepting the difference between 
those types of information and agreeing with its rationale, reference will be made to 
non-financial information as a category comprising CSR information and other 
indicators that are more related to the financial performance of the company. 
b. Should the reports be mandatory?   
Given that there is no agreement on the role Company Law should play in CSR then 
regulation has admittedly left to private initiative the establishment of trends regarding 
non-financial (and CSR) reporting. Thus far CSR has been seen predominantly as a 
voluntary practice and the same has occurred regarding the reports on social 
responsibility, sustainability or non-financial information.53 This room for self-regulation 
has allowed for evolution in this area of Corporate Governance and Business 
Management yet problems concerning the lack of comparability of the information, and 
even more the lack of its utility, cast doubts as to allowing reporting to continue being 
voluntary. While some believe that this should be left to private initiatives others believe 
it is a matter of prescriptive regulation. In favour of allowing it to continue to be 
voluntary are those who claim that private initiative would be more efficient than the 
government in determining the best practices in the market. Moreover,54 it has been 
argued that CSR reporting is a new practice requiring room for adapting to the 
changing needs of enterprises. In addition, that by introducing regulation the political 
lobbying could become an obstacle for efficient practices. Furthermore, regulation by 
different countries would create multiple national regimes that are costly to comply and 
                                                     
52 I. H-Y. Chiu. ‗Standardisation in Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting and a 
Universalist Concept of CSR. A path paved with good intentions‘. 22 Florida Journal of 
International Law 361. 2010. P. 372. 
53 The ICC in particular endorses the view of CSR and non-financial reporting as a 
voluntary practice. See: ICC. The Role of the UN in promoting CSR. Available at 
<www.iccwbo.org/policy/society/id14802/index.html> Accessed on 19 July 2011.  
54 M. Pallenberg. n. 43 above. P. 25. 
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make comparison more difficult. In contrast, supporting mandatory reporting 
commentators find that there is a resolve to end the stagnation on the number of 
reporting companies. In addition, enforcement based on market mechanisms such as 
benchmarking is seen as ineffective; and countries such as France and Denmark 
where non-financial reporting is mandatory have shown a substantial increase as to the 
number of reporting companies.  
On supporting either argument I have found conflicting statistics. A survey made by 
consultancy firms shows that fear of regulation is not a substantial drive for companies 
in their reporting process55 and neither is reputation. The main drive according to this 
survey is the improvement of internal processes. This result would support the view 
that regulation is not needed to increase the number of reports and that private 
initiatives better serve this purpose. Yet the previous argument doesn‘t seem to be so 
straightforward according to another study56 showing that while 50% of the 
interviewees believed that non-financial reporting would remain a niche practice unless 
regulation would step in, 48% believed it would develop into a mainstream practice 
even without regulation. Thus, these numbers do not give a clear sign in the market as 
to whether regulation for reporting should be implemented.  
The UK Government launched a consultation during 2010 on The Future of Narrative 
Reporting and published a summary of the responses57 once the consultation period 
was over. The document collects the opinion of companies, lawyers, unions and NGOs 
on specific questions being asked referring to corporate narrative reporting and some 
of them referring in particular to Environmental, Societal and Governance (ESG) 
issues. There is no consensus in all the consulted topics and in particular on whether 
the reporting regime should be reduced or simplified or reporting should be made 
mandatory. In this last regard a question was made on the usefulness of mandatory 
reporting and encountered divided views. While there was a need to assure 
comparability by unifying the framework through a regulatory scheme the concern was 
                                                     
55 The survey report establishes differences between the point of view of Reporters and 
Readers. In this specific matter their views differ and while Reporters don‘t see 
regulation as a main drive, Readers (in the US) do. Futerra Sustainability 
Communications et al. n. 39 above.  
56 M. Pallenberg. n. 43 above. P. 20. 
57 BIS. The Future of Narrative Reporting. A Consultation. Summary of Responses. 
December 2010. <http://bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/s/10-1318-
summary-of-responses-future-narrative-reporting-consultation.pdf> Accessed on 11 
August 2011. 
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mentioned as to the need for flexibility for companies to be able to tell their unique 
story.58 Others stated that comply or explain standards could improve the reporting and 
the existing non-statutory guidance could be improved. Overall, the view was that a 
market approach would be accepted if accompanied by the strengthening of the FRRP 
(Financial Reporting Review Panel) as an entity in charge of complaints for 
inadequateness or failures in reports. Thus the government seems to have gathered 
proposals and views and is expected to propose a reform. In my opinion, as it will be 
argued, mandatory regulation would be helpful in setting a minimum mandatory 
framework as to what should be reported, yet this is far from being a satisfactory 
response to create socially responsible businesses. Mandatory reporting is only an 
indicator that helps the assessment of a reality and that should not be forgotten when 
discussing these issues. Thus, even though mandatory regulation as to what to report 
is necessary the other phases of the company interaction with stakeholders should be 
considered. That is, regulation should also consider the way the information is being 
produced (interaction with stakeholders), disclosed and used.59 
c. What should be reported? The issue of Standardisation  
What to report? That is the question to answer once it is accepted that there should be 
a report on non-financial matters of a company. In this regard, the lack of regulatory 
consensus alongside with the need to provide that information60 has caused the 
emergence of a broad number of non-regulatory options as to what and how 
companies should report. Initially companies would disclose to the public whatever 
they thought proper (environmental issues were the first topics), and due to the lack of 
coordination or guidance the information became ignored by the market (being self-
laudatory) or difficult to assess. Later the Corporate Social Reports of companies 
included within auditing reports a mention of Triple Bottom Line issues i.e. (ESG). 
                                                     
58 BIS. n. 53 above. P. 21. 
59 D. Hess. ‗The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance 
Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue and Development‘. Michigan Ross School of 
Business Working Paper. No. 01112. July 2008. P. 23. 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1176882> Accesses on 12 August 2011.   
60 Even though accentuating the voluntary nature of CSR and the reporting of it, the 
ICC acknowledges that financial information is not enough for the stakeholders of a 
company and that by reporting non-financial information a company can find certain 
benefits as employee‘s and commercial partners‘ commitment as well as an improved 
capacity to raise capital. ICC. ICC views on economic, environmental and social 
reporting. <http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/society/id599/index.html> Accessed on 19 
July 2011. 
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Following this tendency, many standards for the way the information should be 
reported would be developed61 thus giving a degree of comparability to the assessment 
of the reports. Moreover, other mechanisms are found in best practices and 
investments selection criteria. For instance, in the financial markets indexes as the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index and the FTSE4Good were established as 
incentives for disclosure of social information.  Investment funds with ethical goals 
were created choosing investment decisions based on the social impact or 
sustainability of the project, giving rise to Social Responsible Investment (SRI).62 The 
market created and developed standards to measure the sustainable activities of 
companies. Thus far, the critics of mandatory regulation were right to keep it as a field 
for self-regulation since the flexibility of the voluntary approach allowed 
experimentation on the reporting and in order to avoid mandatory regulation 
considerable progress had been achieved.63  
The G3.1 Guidelines64 as a privately developed standard for the reporting of non-
financial information create parameters that allow companies to choose whether or not 
they want to report as well as the level of the reporting they want to make. The 
guidelines however do not contain an assessment or imply an audit on the content of 
the information. Other standards (not necessarily exclusive with each other) such as 
the UN Global Compact, the ISO2600 or OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises serve as a way to present the information and do not assess its‘ content 
either. For auditing purposes other instruments have been developed. The purpose is 
to provide the market with standardised and comparable data.  
 
However, as expected within a market dynamic, the first initiatives gave rise to several 
standards with different criteria. In addition SRI funds developed their own sets of 
standards in order to choose investment opportunities. This spree of standards turned 
                                                     
61 N. Finch. n. 39 above. P. 9 and D. Hess. n. 55 above. P.17 
62 In this new market for socially responsible investments there is a framework set by 
the UN: The United Nations Principles on Responsible Investment (PRI). 
<http://www.unpri.org/principles/> Accessed on 28 July 2011.   
63 I. H-Y. Chiu. n. 49 above. P. 366.  
64 It is the latest version of the guidelines developed by the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI). <http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Guidelines/> Accessed 
on 23 August 2011.  
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the goal of harmonization into difficult to achieve65 and could now be taken as an 
obstacle for non-financial reporting or if achieved done in very general terms as Chiu 
comments it.66 There are some attempts to standardise corporate reporting. The 
Business Review mandated by S. 417 of the Companies Act 2006 is a general 
example. This statutory reporting requirement intends for directors of companies to 
include in their annual reports the way in which they have engaged with the 
environment, employees and the community to the extent that their business requires 
it. Yet there is no guidance as to how exactly companies should provide for this 
requirement and as a result, there is still no satisfactory regulation for a standardised 
non-financial reporting. The existence of multiple standards could make the reporting of 
information lose its value. However governments should not attempt to develop an 
entirely new approach on their own but instead should rely on the developments 
achieved at an international level in order to facilitate harmonization.67  
d. The utility of non-financial reports for stakeholders  
Given that companies can decide on what to report and even if they report at all 
alongside with the lack of a harmonised set of guidelines to be used in the reports 
there is a consequential lack of comparability of the information reported by 
companies.68 In addition, interest groups (stakeholders) have realised that there are 
other challenges that go beyond reporting itself: companies will only see reporting 
useful in a voluntary context if the cost of incurring in the report is compensated by the 
benefits obtained from it; moreover due to the fact that constituencies can‘t do much 
with the little (or much) information reported then the appeal of reporting as a tool for 
achieving accountability towards stakeholders could be fading turning interest groups 
into alternatives (political activism, public awareness campaigns, etc.) where their 
scarce resources might be put to a better use. Even though there are improvements, 
                                                     
65 At a EU level there are attempts to harmonise the reporting of non-financial 
information. See the Public consultation on disclosure of non-financial information by 
companies available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/non-
financial_reporting_en.htm> Accessed on 11 August 2011.  
66 I. H-Y. Chiu. n. 49 above. P. 366. 
67 An interesting view on standardisation is proposed by Chiu who argues that it has 
unintended effects of convergence in thin issues and causing lack of critical reports 
thus the individualization of a company‘s CSR profile should be encouraged assisted 
by the international efforts as to reporting guidelines and assurance. See, I. H-Y. Chiu. 
n. 49. Above. P. 387.  
68 This was one of the most common complaints about CSR reporting and reporting in 
general. See BIS. n. 53 above.  
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the lack of a single set of guidelines makes the assessment of the information if not 
difficult at least costly, making stakeholders wonder on the effectiveness of the 
resources employed in doing so if there are no material results in sustainability.69 The 
case for mandatory regulation I believe is becoming stronger.  
e. The challenges from a Regulator Perspective: The Remuneration Code and 
Project Merlin as examples of regulation   
In a market economy a company can decide independently how much and on what to 
spend its financial resources. However, there might be circumstances in which the 
private nature of the practice may vanish. This could happen when remuneration 
policies become a factor for encouraging financial risks with macroeconomic effects or 
when there is a substantial disparity between the payments of executives and ordinary 
employees. Executive‘s remuneration,70 in particular in the banking industry, can be a 
good example of the political struggle behind the ability of regulators to alter 
established practices regarding closed interest groups. But the relevance of it for the 
purpose of this paper is not due to this fact but to two factors: On the one hand it is an 
issue that has raised public discontent and on the other hand the regulatory solution 
has been the reporting of information.  
The topic has been subject to academic comments for some years due to the agency 
costs involved and also due to its economic significance. In certain occasions, this 
topic raises sensationalist reactions71 yet there is an apparent substantial increase in 
the level of executive remuneration that is not entirely possible to explain due to size, 
performance or industry reasons.72 Since they are seen as excessive, then 
remuneration policies are subject to public scrutiny and demands for public 
accountability when institution involved in the excess have a public nature or a public 
interest is involved. UK Banks are in this particular situation not only due to the middle 
                                                     
69 D. Hess. n. 55 above. Pp. 38-49. 
70 This includes salary but also the bonus payments, the stock options and long-term 
investment plans.  
71 J. W. Lorsch. ‗The Compensation Silly Season‘. Harvard Business Review Blog 
Network. <http://blogs.hbr.org/hbsfaculty/2011/04/the-compensation-silly-season.html> 
Accessed on 22 August 2011.  
72 For an analysis of the period between 1993 and 2003: L. Bebchuck and Y. Grinstein. 
‗The Growth of Executive Pay‘. The Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics 
and Business Discussion Paper Series. 
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/> Accessed on 23 August 2011.   
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ground in which the banking industry is located between being part of a private profit 
industry and having an embedded social function, but also due to the fact that the 
government chose to inject public funding into some of them with the intention of 
containing the potential collateral effects of their collapse (with the fiscal effect that this 
has caused). Thus, public funding legitimised the calls for public accountability with 
regards to the activities of the bailed out banks, although it appears to have focused 
the spotlight on the entire industry.  
Executive remuneration is thus seen as an issue for regulatory action for several 
reasons. From a Corporate Governance perspective, there are agency costs and the 
potential for conflicts of interest for directors influencing or establishing their own 
remuneration packages at the company‘s expense.73 The UK Corporate Governance 
Code calls on companies to consider this and correspondingly the Section D Main 
Principle states that a company should avoid paying more than what is necessary for 
the role, and should link a significant proportion of the remuneration to corporate and 
individual performance.74 Moreover, after the 2007 crisis, there has been a substantial 
amount of regulation attempting to correct all of the problems that were seen as causes 
of the crisis. Excessive risk-taking, encouraged by inappropriate remuneration policies, 
is one of those factors thus also served to justify regulation.75 In the UK, the Corporate 
Governance Code includes provisions on this and even though they create awareness 
on a sensible topic, its principles-based approach seems to be inadequate for solving 
the problem. The BIS acknowledged that after the crisis, executive remuneration was 
still based on firm size and not in performance and the average remuneration package 
was still increasing.76 Thus, more regulation on executive remuneration was issued. In 
particular it is possible to find two different sets of regulation both using reporting of 
information as part of the solution and thus could be used as reference as to the role 
regulators should play in the reporting of non-financial information.  
On the one hand, the UK Remuneration Code implemented in 2009 and modified in 
2011 is a regulation based on the EU Capital Requirements Directive (CDR3), the 
                                                     
73 BIS. Long Term Focus for Corporate Britain. A Call for Evidence. October 2010. P. 5. 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/l/10-1225-long-term-focus-
corporate-britain Accessed on 11 August 2011.     
74 UK Corporate Governance Code 2010. Section D.  
75 O.S. Simmons. n. 45. P.335. 
76 BIS. n. 5 Directors Remuneration. P. 25.  
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guidelines of the Committee of European Bank Supervisors (CESB) and the Walker 
Report. On the other hand the so-called Project Merlin agreement between the largest 
UK banks and the government. The former uses disclosure of information as part of the 
regulatory response but only as part of a comprehensive set of regulations. It is also 
based on well-developed international standards and its provisions are prescriptive in 
nature. The latter, even though also uses disclosure as part of the regulatory scheme is 
substantially different due to the fact that is an agreement and also because it is rather 
vague and general.  
I intend to draw remarks of each of these and assess their usefulness as standards for 
the reporting of information as a regulatory tool.  
(i) Remuneration Code  
Scope of Application: In its initial version it was only applicable to a restricted 
number of financial entities. However, after the modification made on January 
2011 it will have a substantial change in its scope of application including large 
banks but also all banks and building societies and a substantial number of 
investment firms.77 As to its territorial application it does not limit to institutions 
located on the EEA (European Economic Area) but also subsidiaries of EEA 
located parents that function in non-EEA states.78 In addition, the remuneration 
to which it is applicable is not restricted to senior executives but includes 
provisions applicable on a firm-wide basis. Even though it restricts some 
provisions to Code Staff, this concept is rather extensive including any 
employee capable of taking risks in the name of the company and whose 
remuneration is in the same bracket as that of senior management.79  
Content of the provisions: The Code follows a principles-based approach set 
by the CDR3 and the Corporate Governance Code but goes beyond the latter 
given that it is much more prescriptive and does not limits to simply impose a 
cap on payments. For instance, even though in some cases it only gives an 
indication without categorical statement i.e. while firms should consider an 
                                                     
77 FSA Handbook. SYSC 19A.3.1 R. 
78 FSA Handbook. SYSC 19A.3.1 R. 
79 FSA Handbook. SYSC 19A.3.4 R and 19A.3.6. G.  
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appropriate ratio between fixed and variable remuneration,80 in other provisions 
it states that at least 40% of the payment should be deferred in three to five 
years (this percentage is increased to 60% if the amount is higher than GBP 
500.000 or for some other reasons is considered particularly high).81 The use of 
prescriptive language can also be found in other provisions such as in the case 
of the use of guaranteed bonuses restricting its use only for the first year of 
employment82 or in the restriction for retention bonuses to exceptional 
circumstances (such as the stay during a takeover or a merger)83. The Code 
goes further and establishes a percentage of the variable component of the 
remuneration that should be paid in shares, share-linked instruments or 
equivalent84 (which should be subject to retention clauses as to align the 
interest of the staff with the long-term performance of the company),85 and 
states that in any case the variable or deferred remuneration should be subject 
to readjustment according to individual performance.86  
Disclosure provisions: In regards to disclosure, particular provisions 
require companies to make reports to the FSA with specific information in 
conformity with the CDR3 European requirements.87 Thus, companies acquire a 
responsibility for public disclosure as to: the institutions‘ remuneration policy; 
who is in charge of establishing it; under what criteria; what employees are 
affected by it and why; an explanation of how performance and pay are linked 
and the indicators used to measure it; and the different types of variable 
remuneration used by the company and the rationale for doing so.88 The 
reporting is not made in a one-size-fits-all manner but rather different disclosure 
requirements are created according to the firm‘s characteristics.89 Lastly, and in 
reference to enforcement powers, the FSA is given ample powers to forbid 
                                                     
80 FSA Handbook. SYSC 19A.3.44 R. 
81 I.e. considering the firm‘s size and business. FSA Handbook SYSC 19A.3.49 R 
82 FSA Handbook. SYSC 19A.3.40 R. 
83 FSA Handbook. SYSC 19A.3.43 G. 
84 FSA Handbook. SYSC 19A.3.47 R. 
85 FSA Handbook. SYSC 19A.3.8 R. 
86 FSA Handbook. SYSC 19ª.3.36 R and 19A.3.51 R. 
87 FSA. PS10/21: Implementing CRD requirements on the disclosure of remuneration. 
Annex 1. <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Policy/Policy/2010/10_21.shtml> 
Accessed on 23 August 2011.  
88 FSA Handbook. BIPRU 11.5.18 R.  
89 FSA Handbook. BIPRU 11.5.20 R (2). 
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practices, render void agreements, and claw back payments according to the 
substantive provisions.90 
The intention in assessing the content of the Remuneration Code is not to make critical 
and substantial comments as to its provisions. The intention is to highlight its regulatory 
architecture, recognizing a process where the substantial issue to be regulated was 
controversial but also garnered strong support for political intervention in the form of 
regulation. This in turn made for the development of substantive requirements, part of 
which included disclosure91 of information for assessing the effectiveness of the rules 
provided and to achieve public accountability (and transparency). There is no doubt 
that some of the provisions of the Code are subject to critical assessment as to their 
practical effects such as the restriction of retention bonuses, the territorial application of 
the code, and the compliance costs associated with it. In any case, this statute is 
identifying substantial ways to address the core problem. It is perhaps too early to 
assess the effects of this specific type of regulation, nonetheless and for our purposes 
it can be said that the instrument is comprehensive and ambitious in attempting to 
properly confront the underlying issue.  
(ii) Project Merlin:  
The other example is the agreement announced in February of 2011 and that since 
then has been subject to many press commentaries and exposure, involving the 
UK government and the four largest UK banks called Project Merlin.  
Scope of application: The agreement involves Lloyds, RBS, HSBS, Barclays 
and partially Santander (only regarding lending). It covers four topics: lending, 
taxation, executive pay, and further economical and societal contributions. In return 
for the commitments included in the agreement, banks are then able to expect 
regulatory passivity on the governmental portion. This is already an interesting 
document that raises questions as to its necessity and its nature.  
                                                     
90 Financial Markets Act 2010 S. 139A. (9) and FSA Handbook SYSC 19A.3.54 and 
Annex 1. 
91 Using disclosure as the only regulatory response is deceptive and fails to deal with 
substantive issues. On the matter see: P. Cioppa. n. 46 above.  
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Content of the provisions: The document itself acknowledges, ―the banks 
explicitly recognize their responsibility to support economic recovery‖92 which 
supports the idea that even though they are private entities they still have larger 
responsibilities.93 Briefly mentioned, its content covers the following main points: on 
lending, the commitments are generally aimed to increase the amount of available 
funds for companies without meaning a sacrifice in credit risk as an attempt to 
increase national economic growth. Of particular interest is the fact that the Banks‘ 
CEOs agreed to link their pay on lending targets.94 On taxes, the agreement 
includes the increase in the bank levy tax (already implemented) as a 
compensation for not imposing taxes on bonus payments over a specific amount.95 
On remuneration, the agreement includes a commitment to have the overall bonus 
payments for 2010 lower than those of 2009. The remuneration committees are to 
check the ten highest salaries according to corporate governance provisions (as it 
is already required) and further encourage institutional shareholders engagement in 
this regard. A specific disclosure commitment is reached where banks will publish 
the remuneration for their CEOs, and on basis of anonymity that of its five highest 
paid executives. Special considerations were given to RBS and Lloyds (the bailed 
out banks) establishing a cap on bonus payments for 2011 to be paid in shares that 
should be retained until 2013.  
The necessity of the agreement would need to be assessed according to the different 
topics that it covers yet in general is said to be a threat from the government that 
shows that if banks fail to act then government regulation would be underway.96 
Regarding executive remuneration it is difficult to see it as necessary since European 
and national initiatives already exist as hard law in the UK. Thus, it could be interpreted 
as a sign of mistrust in the efficiency of existing regulation, as a regulation threat or 
                                                     
92 Project Merlin. Banks‘ Statement. 9 February 2011. <www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/bank_agreement_090211.pdf> Accessed on 25 August 2011.   
93 One might argue that due to the social impact of banking activity then social 
responsibilities are more feasible. I am not prepared to accept that proposition but is 
not the intention of this paper to answer it.  
94 Project Merlin. S.1.6. 
95 GBP 25.000. Allegedly it is compensated by the increase in the levy and justified for 
competitive reasons for the banking industry in hiring adequate and capable 
executives. 
96 P. Iglesias Rodriguez. ‗Project Merlin and Regulatory Threat over the UK‘s Banks‘. 
Vol. 32, Issue 7. Business Law Review. July 2011. P 172. 
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merely as a sign of over-regulation after the financial crisis. The nature of the 
document also leaves some space for inquiry. The fact that it is a voluntary agreement 
in return of regulatory easing evidences an underlying political concern for regulators.97 
Given that governments are political entities subject to political risks, they take into 
consideration the exposure of their political capital with a regulatory intervention. 
Moreover, a regulatory intervention may pass-on the responsibility for the underlying 
issues to regulators who failed to fix the problem and while the political capital 
increases if the intervention is successful, the opposite occurs if it fails.98 The 
motivation for regulatory intervention is even more constrained when it refers to issues 
affecting established interest groups due to the lobbying achieved by them. Project 
Merlin and his provisions on banks‘ remuneration seem to expose this reality. While the 
UK government faces public discontent with payment of banks‘ bonuses, particularly 
acute in the after-crisis, a strong intervention may affect its political capital due to the 
threat of relocation (whether real or not) made by some banks in case of excessive 
regulation.99 This agreement can be an attempt to achieve a feeling of public 
accountability but with no substantive effect. In the end is simply a press act directed to 
the electorate. The agreement itself is not comprehensive since it covers only a small 
number of institutions with an arguably restricted overall effect on the UK economy. Its 
provisions are rather general and in some cases repeat existing regulation. There are 
no clear consequences as to what would happen in case of a breach by the Banks and 
the regulatory threat is not credible due to the strong position of the banks and their 
potential relocation, which would be critical for the City of London and the UK‘s 
economy.100 As to the provisions regarding pay, it limits only to bonuses which are just 
one of the components of executive remuneration. The provisions fail to establish a 
parameter for future behaviour stating only that 2010 payments are not to exceed the 
previous year. The disclosure component of the regulation is not clear and once the 
information is published there is no guideline as to what to do with that information. 
Disclosure seems to be used as a way to calm public demands. The entire document 
provides an appearance of action with no substantive effect. Again, this instrument is 
yet to show its effectiveness but I believe it shows deficiencies of public policy in facing 
the regulatory challenge. 
                                                     
97 O.S. Simmons. n. 45 above. P. 363. 
98 O.S. Simmons. N. 45 above. P. 365.  
99 P. Iglesias Rodriguez. n. 93 above. P. 174. 
100 P. Iglesias Rodriguez. n. 93 above. P. 175. 
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The bias is apparent in the two approaches as to the use of disclosure as a regulatory 
tool. The latter shows a lack of a coherent policy as to the use of disclosure, and at 
most attempts to rely on achieving public accountability through the reporting of 
information on remuneration, increasing public awareness and supporting the 
eventuality of a regulatory response if ever one is to be needed. Even though it could 
be said that it follows the corporate governance goals of reducing excessive risk taking, 
aligning remuneration with long-term performance, and using performance as the 
indicator for payment, by and large its effect is counterproductive. This would add 
reason for dismissing disclosure and reporting as a useful technique, serving only as a 
way of allowing window dressing.  
4. A corollary: Can governments create socially responsible business by 
requiring the reporting of non-financial information?  
From a regulatory perspective, disclosure of information is sought as the best solution 
because does not impose substantive socially responsible roles to companies (since 
there is no dogmatic justification for them) but gives the appearance of political 
engagement (when there are calls for action). However, looked at carefully it might be 
a negative response since it postpones the implementation of substantial regulatory 
measures and brings about a reputation for disclosure as a neutral and ineffective 
instrument. The future may pose a different landscape if the increased public 
awareness caused by the disclosure creates the democratic legitimacy that would 
allow the existence of substantive regulation. Currently there is no consensus as to the 
role that regulation should play as regards non-financial information in general.  
Additionally, the existing economic outlook does not seem to create a friendly setting 
for imposing the disclosure of non-financial information, since it is likely to create 
compliance costs in a time where expenses should be thought through carefully. The 
2007 crisis caused a substantial loss of investors‘ confidence in the market and the 
way companies do business. Therefore if one of the desirable effects of increasing 
corporate reporting were the consequential improvement of market transparency, then 
mandatory reporting should be a desirable regulatory response. Yet merely requiring 
new or different reports from companies would not be sufficient.101 The absence of a 
                                                     
101 Referring to the effectiveness of disclosure regarding executive remuneration: ―… if 
past history is any indication of future performance, disclosure rules cannot fully curb 
REVIST@ e – Mercatoria  Volumen 10, Número 2 (julio – diciembre 
2011) 
(Rev. e-mercatoria) 
 
153 Universidad Externado de Colombia. Departamento de Derecho Comercial                     
 
unified reporting standard and the lack of rationale as to a company‘s social 
responsibilities has created mistrust in the information disclosed by companies. Would 
this change automatically with the introduction of a statutory requirement mandating 
report of non-financial information? Hardly. All things being equal, a mandatory report 
would create a compliance exercise with no substantial effect for CSR practices. 
Therefore the problem of requiring the report of non-financial information to create 
social responsibilities should not only address whether or not should companies report, 
but also address the process of how the information reported is produced and how it is 
later assessed by its consumers.102 Moreover, mandatory regulation would eventually 
cause an increase on the number of reports but this would not mean that companies 
are improving their CSR practices. The materiality of a company‘s responsible 
behaviour is not represented by a report but by actual practices. Further efforts need to 
be made to change the way companies operate. If reporting cannot achieve substantial 
results then interest groups will focus on alternatives for changing the way companies 
do business, yet regulation could still allow for reporting to be used accordingly.   
Providing relevant information to the market is still a useful tool. A regulatory 
intervention should therefore consider that the issue is more complex than just simply 
requiring a report and letting the market see what it does with that information. Self-
regulation has shown some advances but regulators can‘t afford to continue being 
bystanders. The Remuneration Code is a regulatory model that should be considered 
as reference. A strong justification for substantive regulation was needed for the code. 
In the case of the reporting of non-financial information a global economy in need of 
sustainable business practices would meet this requirement and justify in general the 
existence of regulation regarding CSR. As to whether or not there is a justification for 
mandatory reporting, based on the recent studies referred to above, non-financial 
information does in fact create social responsible business focused on long term 
growth and create an increase in share price, thus regulation could be justified in the 
need to encourage this results. Even though self-regulation would probably be the best 
way to achieve the desired results, an adequate regime can allow the debate to 
continue and not stiffen it.  
                                                                                                                                                           
abuses or pay levels. In certain in- stances, enhanced disclosure may actually lead to 
higher pay levels, and it can give rise to more opaque forms of compensation.‖ O.S. 
Simmons. n. 45 above. P. 343. 
102 D. Hess. N. 55 above. P. 30.   
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Substantive regulation and the use of disclosure can achieve public accountability for 
companies by attempting to solve the underlying problem. In the case of CSR, 
achieving this requires a regulatory response that should be comprehensive and 
include disclosure as one of its multiple elements, taking as a model internationally 
accepted CSR reporting standards.103 Although the focus should be substantial 
provisions regarding CSR practices, the reporting of non-financial information remains 
a useful tool thus some comments can be made as to the path in which prospective 
regulation could be directed.  
As a starting point, reporting of non-financial information should be compulsory based 
on a -comply or explain- approach. This would allow a balance between the flexibility 
for this emerging type of corporate reporting while at the same time providing useful 
information to the market. Likewise, understanding that not all companies face the 
same stakeholders and/or their interest may differ substantially then a -one size fits all- 
regulation should be avoided. For harmonization purposes the European Union is the 
ideal (although politically perhaps the most unlikely) actor to create an international 
regime and thus its current consultation processes will be decisive. A principles based 
Directive from the European Commission would support the creation of this 
international regime and allow EU Member States to have a degree of flexibility as to 
their national regimes, yet in order to avoid lack of comparability in the information 
produced European regulation should include provisions stating Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs). A mix of principles and specific provisions would give content to the 
disclosed information. Indicators should vary depending on the industry and size of 
company. Hence a default regime of KPIs for large companies104 could be established 
at EU levels according to issues applicable to companies regardless of their industry. 
                                                     
103 The EU launched a consultation on non-financial information reporting and the 
prevailing view from participants was that even though the reporting regime needed 
changes those changes should use the development of existing international standards 
instead of creating new European standards. The consultation period ended and the 
responses were published and an Expert Group was appointed to discuss the 
underlying issues. An initial meeting was held in July and the second one is to be held 
during September. <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/non-
financial_reporting_en.htm> Accessed on 23 August 2011.   
104 Whether or not this should be extended to SMEs is likely to be a debatable issue. 
Ideally it should cover all companies but compliances costs might be a stronger 
argument against it. Therefore the application should at least focus on large companies 
either expecting a benchmarking process that would lead these practices into the entire 
market or leaving room for further regulation to extend it.  
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Issues such as employee-employer relationship and environmental policies could be 
appropriate, still allowing member states to extend them as long as they are within the 
supporting principles. KPIs for specific industries should be treated separately. 
European regulation should set the principles leaving prescriptive regulation for 
member states. In any case, even if European regulation is not achieved the UK should 
still commit to a regulatory framework that could be at the forefront of the non-financial 
reporting regime.  
It is foreseeable that this approach awakes scepticism due to the increase in 
compliance costs105 and in merely turning reporting into boilerplate regulation. These 
arguments should be contested by including the possibility of making this information 
available through different means106 and by an active regulator aiding the enforcement 
of the reporting regime. In this regard the FRRP (Financial Reporting Review Panel) in 
the UK, who is in charge of ensuring that companies audit reports are kept according to 
regulatory standards, could have the same function regarding non-financial reporting. 
Furthermore, regulation should also serve the purpose of encouraging companies to 
engage in a dialogue with particular stakeholders according to specific needs (the way 
in which they do should not be mandatory and room for experimenting allowed) giving 
them the opportunity to use the reported information. The Corporate Governance Code 
already includes some issues regarding shareholder engagement107 yet other 
constituencies should be included in accordance with the Stakeholder theory. 
However, since the rationale for including other constituencies is far from being clear 
and the prevailing criteria is the Shareholder Wealth Maximization or Shareholder 
Primacy, then disclosure of non-financial information should not create direct liability for 
companies or its‘ directors so that fear of litigation does not function as a deterrent for 
efficient reporting. In spite of this, there should be an effective use of the information by 
stakeholders by allowing them to initiate claims before regulation authorities that would 
                                                     
105 A substantial increase in the cost might defeat the whole purpose of regulation 
especially if companies don‘t see clearly and added value for incurring in them. With 
regards to the costs in carbon reporting: ‗Green group disputes carbon reporting costs'. 
Financial Times. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7179cf4e-b93d-11e0-b6bb-00144f> 
Accessed on 23 June 2011.  
106 Reference to websites and the consistency or layout of the reports could help the 
assessment of the information included in them. In this regard some views were 
encountered in the BIS consultation document cited in n. 53 above.  
107 UK Corporate Governance Code 2010. Section E. This is consistent with the 
prevailing view in the UK of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization theory.  
REVIST@ e – Mercatoria  Volumen 10, Número 2 (julio – diciembre 
2011) 
(Rev. e-mercatoria) 
 
156 Universidad Externado de Colombia. Departamento de Derecho Comercial                     
 
be in charge of making an investigation.108 Taken as a whole this general framework 
supports the existing developments on non-Financial Reporting at UK and European 
levels while at the same time could respond to the concerns regarding flexibility and 
compliance costs. The bottom-line is that regulation needs to take a substantial 
approach leaning the balance towards social responsible business helping the 
discussion progress and using reporting as a highly useful complementary regulatory 
tool.109 
The regulatory challenges for CSR are considerable. The Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization perspective still prevails. However, this is not an insurmountable problem 
for CSR. On the one hand, managers and executives no longer accept the fact that 
companies should only consider the interest of shareholders. Even if not required by 
law, they see an interest in doing so. The long-term success of a company depends on 
an adequate engagement with larger constituencies. This is simply a business reality 
apart from any Company Law dogma. The need for non-financial information in the 
market is also increasing. On top of all the figures that can be shown to support this 
increase,110 the publication by the United Nations Principles for Responsible 
Investment Stock Exchanges of a letter from a coalition of investors to the CEO‘s of 30 
stock exchanges demanding the inclusion of sustainability criteria as part of listing 
rules is very significant.111 On the other hand, under the prevailing view a regulatory 
solution will have greater challenges. There are currently some attempts of reaching a 
                                                     
108 A sanction regime should be implemented so that fear of enforcement helps the 
application of the regime. Again, the FRRP could serve as a model.  
109 The Institute of Directors does not support mandatory regulation for narrative 
reporting. Compliance costs, self-regulation and lack of added value are strong 
reasons for this, thus preferring other measures such as executive training. IOD. ‗DTI 
Invitation for Comment son the Business Review‘ and ‗DTI Consultation on Narrative 
Reporting Requirements for Companies‘. 24th march 2006. 
<http://www.iod.com/MainWebSite/Resources/Document/policy_consultation_business
_review.pdf> Accessed on July 2011.  
110 Although numbers don‘t reflect content, it can be an indicator that last year around 
8.220 companies published almost 5,400 reports of non-financial information across 
168 countries. This numbers are provided by an U.S. private database 
CorporateRegister.com cited by Eccles, Krzus and Serafeim. n. 38 above. P. 4. Also, 
according to the G3 guidelines, the most widely available standard for the report of 
non-financial information by 2005 the number of companies using their guidelines 
increased in more than 600% since its launch on 2000 and on an additional 400% by 
2010. www.globalreporting.org/ReportingServices/GRIReportsList/, Accessed on 
November 2011.  
111 The letter can be found in http://www.unpri.org/files. Accessed on November 2011.  
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regulatory response but in the meantime private initiatives will continue setting the 
pace. These initiatives could help in the continuing definition of CSR disclosure and 
eventually achieve a future separate from that of non-financial reporting. The IRRC 
could be a successful attempt to bring a uniform reporting standard although 
apparently does not treat separately CSR information. At a point where sovereign 
power fails to achieve the behavioural change that is needed, private practices emerge 
as an alternative and self-regulation is and would continue to move forward either by 
honest beliefs that CSR should form part of a business culture, or at least in order to 
avoid inefficient government-imposed regulation. This in itself is a difficult and costly 
process, and the main question remains whether or not a timely solution will be 
achieved in a world with scarce resources and lack of sustainable business practices. 
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